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Creating Ecclesiastical Immunity: How the Supreme Court of
North Carolina Stripped Civil Protections from Religious
Bodies in Harris v. Matthews*
Separation of church and state under the First Amendment has
long been a hotly debated issue in the jurisprudence of the United
States. However, despite this lasting attempt to strike a fair balance
between religious freedom and secular law, cases against pastors and
church officials regarding church property disputes are not always
afforded the protection of civil laws in a civil court. In order to steer
clear of any potential First Amendment infringement, the Supreme
Court of the United States has articulated a doctrine that forbids civil
court determination of any dispute that touches on ecclesiastical
matters.' Under this regime, judicial resolution of church disputes is
allowed only when the issues at stake can be resolved using "neutral
principles of law."2 On its face, this doctrine purports to be a rational
precaution taken to preserve the freedoms of religious institutions
crafted by this country's founders. However, applied too
conservatively, it can grant virtual immunity from state and federal
law to religious officials as demonstrated by the result in a recent case
from North Carolina, Harris v. Matthews.3 In Harris, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held that its courts could not hear a case
involving the gross misappropriation of church funds by a pastor on
the grounds that a decision on the dispute would require a court to
* Copyright © 2008 by Tracy N. Stewart.
1. See Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
2. Id.; see infra notes 29, 44-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of "neutral
principles of law." Courts and scholars alike have noted that there is an underlying
tension between the Free Exercise and the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment
as applied to cases of church property disputes. See Patti Gerstenblith, Civil Court
Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513,
518 (1990). While the Establishment Clause limits the amount of support a government
may give to a religious organization, the Free Exercise Clause conversely requires the
government to provide a certain level of support to such organizations. Id. at 519. The
"neutral principles of law" doctrine resolves this tension by requiring a court to treat
property disputes among religious organizations as they would any non-religious body. Id.
at 520. In other words, a court should decide any property issue brought by a religious
organization according to "neutral principles of law"; when that is not possible, a court
should abstain from deciding the issue. Id. at 521.
3. 361 N.C. 265, 643 S.E.2d 566 (2007).
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rule on ecclesiastical matters.4 The court's ruling left the parishioner
plaintiffs without a remedy by which to reclaim their lost property
and effectively granted church officials in North Carolina immunity in
future church property disputes.
This Recent Development will argue that the court's ruling in
Harris v. Matthews was unnecessarily harsh in so circumscribing a
court's ability to hear property disputes arising within and among
religious organizations. First, this Recent Development will offer an
in-depth discussion of the specific facts and holding of the Harris case.
Next, it will explore the existing Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding property disputes involving religious organizations and
provide an analysis of the "neutral principles of law" doctrine. This
Recent Development will go on to discuss how the doctrine has been
previously applied in North Carolina and will assert that the Harris
decision marks an unnecessary departure from that jurisprudence as
well as other jurisdictions' decisions on similar issues. Finally, this
Recent Development will examine the implications of the Harris
decision in North Carolina and will argue that a less stringent holding
was both possible, given the state and federal precedent, and
desirable, to avoid providing unchecked immunity to religious
officials and organizations. Overall, this Recent Development will
argue that the Harris court inappropriately found that any resolution
of the property dispute at issue would necessarily touch on
"ecclesiastical matters," and that the issue at stake could have been
resolved using the "neutral principles of law" doctrine articulated by
the Supreme Court of the United States.5 Applying the "neutral
principles of law" doctrine in this way, it is possible to reconcile
notions of religious freedom inherent to the First Amendment with
appropriate civil consequences for religious organizations.
In Harris v. Matthews, members of Saint Luke Missionary
Baptist Church ("Saint Luke") filed a derivative suit on behalf of the
church against its pastor and several church officials alleging, among
other claims, extensive misappropriation of church funds.6 Though
the complaint was not filed until July of 2003, the plaintiffs first
became suspicious of the governance of church funds in 2001, after
4. Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571 (noting that "[b]ecause no neutral principles of law
exist to resolve plaintiffs' claims, the courts must defer to the church's internal governing
body.., thereby avoiding becoming impermissibly entangled in the dispute").
5. Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 449 (holding that there are "neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without 'establishing'
churches to which property is awarded").
6. Harris, 361 N.C. at 268, 643 S.E.2d at 568.
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the church's accountant wrote a letter detailing "major problems with
the reconciliation of the amounts of Sunday collections and bank
deposits.",7  A year-long struggle ensued in which the parishioner
plaintiffs fought with church officials to obtain full access to the
church's complete financial records.' The parishioners finally gained
access to the church's legal and financial records in July of 2002, but
only after a trial court order required Saint Luke to comply with their
request for the documents.9  After reviewing the records, the
parishioner plaintiffs identified nearly $260,000 of the church's money
that they believed had been misappropriated by the defendants over a
three-and-a-half-year period.'0
Faced with such alarming information regarding the use of their
church's funds, the plaintiffs were quick to bring suit against both the
pastor and certain members of the church's governing body,
specifically alleging that those individuals breached their fiduciary
duty to the church, converted church funds and participated in a civil
conspiracy." The church officials, in response, promptly filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which was
denied by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals of North
Carolina.12 Refusing to be defeated, the church officials then filed an
7. Plaintiff Appellee's New Brief at 5, Harris, 361 N.C. 265, 643 S.E.2d 566 (No.
479PA05-2), 2006 WL 3226634.
8. Id.
9. Harris, 361 N.C. at 268, 643 S.E.2d at 568.
10. Plaintiff Appellee's New Brief, supra note 7, at 6. For example, the audit showed
that
[d]efendant Matthews and others made monthly out-of-town trips by air and
stayed at luxury hotels such as the Radisson, Sheraton, Hilton and Omni.
Expensive restaurant meals were charged, including $235.00 at Harpers
Restaurant; $249.00 at Mortons of Chicago; $406.00 at the Tower Club; and
$367.00 at Park Avenue BBQ in Palm Beach, Florida, just to name just a few.
Large clothing and gift purchases were made at: The Casual Male ($220.00);
Talbots (silk jacket, skirt, etc.) ($377.00); Sharon Comers Men's Apparel
($963.91); and Godiva Chocolate ($42.00). In addition, funeral services for
Defendant Matthews' father ($2,954) and lodging at the Radisson ($1,521) were
paid for by the Church credit card in West Palm Beach, Florida, during a trip that
Defendant Matthews made in June 2002.
Id. at7.
11. Harris, 361 N.C. at 268, 643 S.E.2d at 568.
12. Id.; see also Harris v. Matthews, No. 05-28, 2006 WL 389647, at *2 (N.C. Ct. App.
Feb. 21, 2006) for the court of appeals' decision. The court of appeals noted that because
the trial court had denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, that ruling was interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Id. at *1.
However, the court also noted that interlocutory orders are immediately reviewable when
a party can show that the trial court's decision deprives him of a substantial right that
would otherwise be lost without immediate review. Id. Regardless, the court of appeals
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appeal from the interlocutory order13 to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina on the grounds that the case implicated a substantial First
Amendment right which would cause injury to the church if the trial
court were to become "entangled in ecclesiastical matters from which
it should have abstained.'
14
In a 4-2 decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that a decision on the issue
in the case would require judicial consideration of ecclesiastical
matters, which the Supreme Court of the United States expressly
forbade in its Presbyterian decision. 5  The court held that
"[d]etermining whether actions, including expenditures, by a church's
pastor, secretary, and chairman of the Board of Trustees were proper
requires an examination of the church's view of the role of the pastor,
staff, and church leaders, their authority and compensation, and
church management."16 In an attempt to bolster its position, the court
then analogized the situation at bar to one in which a court is asked to
rule on the adequacy or correctness of spiritual grounds for
membership in the church.' 7 The court stated that an inquiry as to
spiritual correctness is an inherently ecclesiastical matter, and thus,
one that no court could settle using "neutral principles of law."18
Although the comparison between judicial determination of the
adequacy of spiritual guidelines-an inherently doctrinal-based
inquiry-and a ruling on a property dispute seems weak, the court
nevertheless used this analogy to illustrate that the issue in Harris
could not be resolved using "neutral principles of law."19
Overall, the Harris ruling is quite damaging to future claims
brought by religious congregations frustrated by misuse of their
church property. The Harris majority found that it was enough for
one party to merely indicate a concern that a suit would touch on an
"ecclesiastical matter" to have that matter dismissed-even when
there was no evidence that the case would present ecclesiastical issues
determined that there was no meaningful constitutional question at issue which would
deprive defendants of a substantial right, and the court dismissed the appeal. Id. at *2.
13. See supra note 12 for a discussion of the appeals process for an interlocutory
order.
14. Harris, 361 N.C. at 269-71, 643 S.E.2d at 570.
15. Id. at 270, 643 S.E.2d at 570-71 (citing Presbyterian Church in the United States v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
16. Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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in the pleadings.2' Such a ruling acts as a virtual bar on all claims that
have any connection to a church body. As Justice Hudson warned in
her dissent, "this approach could have the unintended consequence of
allowing, or even inviting, misbehavior by church officials who could
then avoid court review by baldly asserting that further review would
result in impermissible entanglement in ecclesiastical matters."'"
Given the existing decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States on this issue, the holding of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Harris was unduly strict. While the court was correct to
note that the Supreme Court of the United States forbids
consideration of any matter that touches on ecclesiastical issues and
that any dispute involving a religious organization must be resolved
using "neutral principles of law,"22 this precedent did not preclude
consideration of the issues presented in Harris. Federal jurisprudence
regarding the "neutral principles of law" doctrine originated when a
Georgia state case made its way to the Supreme Court of the United
States.23  The issue in the Presbyterian case arose when the
congregations of two local Presbyterian churches decided to detach
themselves from a larger governing hierarchical church
organization.24 After the withdrawal, a property dispute arose as to
which body-the hierarchical organization or the defecting local
congregations-owned the property physically held by the local
churches.25 Under Georgia law, ultimate determination of property
ownership turned on a finding of whether the local churches'
withdrawals were due to a "fundamental or substantial abandonment
of the original tenets and doctrines" on the part of the hierarchical
church organization.26
On the basis of these facts, the Supreme Court issued a dual-
pronged ruling regarding civil court determination of church property
disputes. First, the Court held that civil courts should have "no role
in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving
20. Id. at 280, 643 S.E.2d at 575 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
23. See id.
24. Id. at 441-43.
25. Id. at 443.
26. Id. (noting that "Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the
benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the general church adhere to its
tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches").
2008] 1747
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property disputes." 7  However, the Court did note that not all
property disputes arising from religious organizations implicate First
Amendment separation of church and state concerns. 8 As such, the
Court recognized in the second prong of its holding that "there are
neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes,
which can be applied" to resolve property disputes arising among
religious organizations and which do not implicate the First
Amendment. 9 Given that resolution of the issue in Presbyterian
required an interpretation of church "tenets and doctrines,"3 the
Court ultimately found that such a determination required a ruling on
ecclesiastical matters and was an improper inquiry for a civil court of
the United States.3t
The ruling in Presbyterian is important because it introduces the
"neutral principles of law" doctrine, which articulates a standard for
courts to follow when faced with cases concerning property disputes
among religious organizations. However, the facts of Presbyterian
differ from those in Harris in important ways that suggest the North
Carolina court could have tried and decided the case, rather than
simply dismissing it. First, the Presbyterian Court would have had to
rule on whether a hierarchical religious body had departed from
fundamental church principles, as Georgia law required that such a
departure occur before property owned by the hierarchical
organization could be released from trust. 2  Such an inquiry
inherently involves consideration and ruling on ecclesiastical issues.
By contrast, the Harris court was merely asked to determine whether
a pastor and other church officials had improperly used church funds
for their personal benefit." Further, despite holding that it would be
improper for any court to adjudicate the matter before it, the
Presbyterian Court definitively concluded that a civil court can
resolve matters such as property disputes involving religious
27. Id. at 447. The Court further noted that "First Amendment values are plainly
jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil
courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice." Id. at 449.
28. The Court noted that civil courts do not violate the Free Exercise Clause by
merely "opening their doors to disputes involving church property"; neither do they
violate the establishment clause by finding in favor of-and, thus, granting property to-
one religious body over another. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 449-50.
32. Id. at 443.
33. Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 273, 643 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2007).
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organizations, so long as it can do so using "neutral principles of
law."'
Ultimately, the Presbyterian Court did not expound upon what it
meant by "neutral principles of law" other than to suggest that they
are principles that may be used to adjudicate property disputes
among any group, religiously affiliated or not. 5 However, eight years
later, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to elaborate on what it
meant by "neutral principles of law" when it granted certiorari in a
second case involving a church property dispute. Jones v. Wolf,36
another case from the Georgia state courts, involved a dispute over
ownership of church land that arose after a majority of a local church
congregation withdrew from a hierarchical organization and
continued to possess and control the church property. 7 The
hierarchical organization then announced that the remaining minority
faction, which had maintained its ties with the hierarchical
organization, constituted the true congregation of the church and, as
such, retained ownership rights to the church property. 8  The
question presented to the Supreme Court was whether ownership of
the property was an issue appropriate for determination by a civil
court pursuant to "neutral principles of law," or whether a court must
defer to the decision of the hierarchical organization. 9
In ruling on the issue, the Court first inquired as to whether the
property was held by deed or in trust.40 Again, this inquiry was
necessary because Georgia law "implies a trust of local church
property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condition
that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice
existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches" in the absence
of documentation indicating otherwise.4 To determine ultimate
ownership of the church property, the Jones Court looked to the
constitutional provisions of the general church in the Book of Church
Order. 2 Because this document was not instructive on the ownership
question, the trial court applied Georgia implied trust law.43 The
34. Presbyterian, 393 U.S. at 449.
35. See id.
36. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
37. Id. at 598.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 597.
40. Id. at 602-03.
41. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 443 (1969).
42. Jones, 443 U.S. at 601.
43. Id.
2008] 1749
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Supreme Court held that the inquiry did not involve a ruling on
ecclesiastical matters, as forbidden by Presbyterian, but instead
involved simple application of state property laws. The adjudication
was thus based on "neutral principles of law."'  Additionally, the
Jones Court cited a Maryland case in support of its decision as an
illustration of appropriate use of the "neutral principles of law"
doctrine.45 The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari
on the case because it felt that there was no substantial federal
question in light of the fact that the local church property disputes
could be settled without an inquiry into religious doctrine.46
Jones sets forth the idea that a civil court may analyze and
interpret the language of religious charters and church constitutions
without violating the "neutral principles of law doctrine. '47
Accordingly, the Jones Court found that the Georgia court's
determination that the property in question was owned by the "local
congregation" was both a proper inquiry and was properly decided.48
The more difficult question for the Supreme Court was determining
which body-the majority or the minority faction-constituted the
"local congregation." 49 The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia
courts ruled in favor of the majority faction by seeming to apply a
presumption in favor of the majority.5" Though remanding the case to
the Supreme Court of Georgia to articulate a more exact holding of
law, the Supreme Court of the United States did find that such a
44. See generally Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 272, 643 S.E.2d 566, 570 (citing
Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 319, 200 S.E.2d 641, 650 (1973) for the proposition that a
court can review issues such as "(1) [w]ho constitutes the governing body of this particular
[church], and (2) who has that governing body determined to be entitled to use the
properties" without risking adjudication of ecclesiastical matters). Such inquiries are
analogous to applying state property laws to determine ownership of church property. See
infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's decision in Atkins.
45. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 (citing Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church
of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970)).
46. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368; see also Jones, 443 U.S.
at 603 (noting that the dispute in Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God was resolved
"on the basis of the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state
statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of
the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property").
47. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; see also Elizabeth Ehrlich, Note, Taking the Religion Out of
Religious Property Disputes, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (2005) (noting that the "neutral
principles of law" doctrine allows civil courts "to interpret relevant provisions of a
religious organization's governing documents-such as deeds, church constitutions,
bylaws, and contracts-under current state law").
48. Jones, 433 U.S. at 601.
49. Id. at 606-07.
50. Id. at 607.
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presumption "would be consistent with both the neutral-principles
analysis and the First Amendment."'"
The Jones holding provided a novel application of the "neutral
principles of law" doctrine. Prior to this ruling, courts had uniformly
deferred to church authorities to define terms such as "congregation"
under the theory that determining the identity of that body was an
ecclesiastical matter.52 In Jones, however, the Supreme Court of the
United States expanded the "neutral principles of law" doctrine by
acknowledging not only that a court could properly interpret religious
documents under the "neutral principles of law" guidelines, but that
in many cases, it must do so to reach a fair and considered verdict.53
The Court's acknowledgment that a civil court may interpret religious
deeds, charters, and other documents marked an expansion of the
"neutral principles of law" doctrine and a further shift away from a
policy of deference in all church property disputes.54 The Court went
on to note that, pursuant to the "neutral principles of law" doctrine,
"a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in
purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts."55 Overall,
the Jones decision illustrates the willingness of the Supreme Court to
allow certain matters connected to the church to be decided by a civil
court using the "neutral principles" doctrine. Perhaps most
importantly, the Court's decision shows that it did not intend
"ecclesiastical matters" to have an unlimited meaning.56
Harris is not the first North Carolina case to grapple with how to
interpret the Supreme Court's mandate to apply "neutral principles
of law" to civil issues regarding the church. As early as 1973, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina struggled with the question of
when to intervene in matters involving religious bodies. Though its
51. Id. The Court also held that such a presumption would be subject to defeasance
"upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other
means." Id.
52. See id. at 611; see also David Young & Steven Tigges, Into the Religious Thicket -
Constitutional Limits on Civil Court Jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical Disputes, 47 OHIO ST.
L.J. 475, 497 (1986) (noting that the Court's holding that it must "apply neutral principles
to decide who constitutes the local congregation" is novel).
53. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604 ("The neutral principles method ... requires a civil court to
examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in
favor of the general church.").
54. See Ehrlich, supra note 47, at 1079 (noting that the Jones decision marked a shift
in the deferential attitude of the Court toward adjudicating religious property disputes).
55. Jones, 433 U.S. at 604.
56. See Young & Tigges, supra note 52, at 498 (noting that "[a]fter Jones, the courts
need not defer to church authorities ... but can proceed to adjudicate it according to
neutral principles, whatever they may be").
2008] 1751
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decision in Atkins v. Walker 7 provided the basis for the court's
reasoning in Harris,5 8 the Atkins decision set a precedent that should
have resulted in a different outcome in Harris. Atkins involved a
dispute between two factions of the Little Mountain Baptist Church,
wherein certain members of the church congregation accused church
leaders of taking improper actions that departed from traditionally
accepted church doctrine, which entitled the members to take
ownership of the church property.59 At trial, the jury was asked to
determine whether the plaintiffs (members of the church) remained
"faithful to the doctrines and practices of the Little Mountain Baptist
Church recognized and accepted by the Plaintiffs and the Defendants
prior to the division"6 and whether the defendants (church leaders)
"departed radically and fundamentally from the characteristic usages,
customs, doctrines and practices of the Little Mountain Baptist
Church accepted by all members prior to the division."'"
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that such
a determination constituted a ruling on "ecclesiastical matters," which
the nation's highest court forbid in Presbyterian.62 However, it is
important to note that the court did not make a sweeping dismissal of
all future property disputes brought by conflicting factions of a
religious organization. To the contrary, the court held that it was
within the authority and the duty of courts to consider and rule on
property disputes which can be resolved using "neutral principles of
law" as set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States.63
Furthermore, the court explicitly mapped out two definitively
appropriate questions for a civil court to address when considering
property disputes involving religious organizations: "(1) [w]ho
constitutes the governing body of [a] ... particular ... church, and (2)
who has that governing body determined to be entitled to use the
properties."'  The Atkins court noted that although the plaintiffs
alleged that meetings of the church's governing body were conducted
improperly-an inquiry the court acknowledged would be
appropriate for a civil judiciary-they did not present any evidence to
57. 284 N.C. 306, 200 S.E.2d 641 (1973).
58. Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 272, 643 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2007) (articulating the
North Carolina standard for "neutral principles of law" set out in Atkins).
59. Atkins, 284 N.C. at 307-08, 200 S.E.2d at 642-43.
60. Id. at 308, 200 S.E.2d at 643.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 321, 200 S.E.2d at 651.
63. Id. at 319, 200 S.E.2d at 650.
64. See id.; see also Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 272, 643 S.E.2d 566, 571 (2007).
1752 [Vol. 86
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support these allegations. 65 Accordingly, the only issues left for the
court to decide-whether the church members remained faithful to
church doctrine and whether church leaders radically departed from
church doctrines and customs-required an evaluation of church
doctrines, which the court correctly deemed to be an inappropriate
inquiry.'
To further accentuate that this decision was not meant to
preempt all future court considerations of internal church property
disputes, the Atkins court strongly emphasized the duty a civil court
has to consider such issues:
It nevertheless remains the duty of civil courts to determine
controversies concerning property rights over which such courts
have jurisdiction and which are properly brought before them,
notwithstanding the fact that the property is church property.
Neither the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States nor the comparable provision in Article I, Section 13, of
the Constitution of North Carolina deprives those entitled to
the use and control of church property of protections afforded
by government to all property owners alike, such as the services
of the Fire Department, police protection from vandals and
trespassers or access to the courts for the determination of
contract and property rights.67
It is telling that the court felt compelled to make such a strong
statement. In writing this decision, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina understood the risk that future courts might interpret the
decision as a mandate that courts should not tackle any issue
regarding property disputes from church organizations. The court's
statement illustrates not only that such a result was not intended by
the justices, but also that it was a result they felt compelled to combat.
As such, Atkins should be seen not as precluding or even making
more difficult the determinations of church property disputes; rather,
it should be seen as defining a line between adjudicating based on
"neutral principles of law" and ruling on ecclesiastical issues.
In Harris, the Supreme Court of North Carolina departed from
the underlying logic in Atkins. The facts in Harris differ from those in
Atkins in several key ways, indicating that a court could have reached
65. Atkins, 284 N.C. at 321, 200 S.E.2d at 651. However, the court noted that there
was evidence tending to show that, at certain meetings, votes of non-members were
incorrectly counted with the majority, shedding doubt on the idea that the meetings did, in
fact, follow their own stated procedures correctly. Id.
66. Id. at 308, 200 S.E.2d at 643.
67. Id. at 318, 200 S.E.2d at 650 (emphasis added).
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a decision using "neutral principles of law." To resolve the issue
before it, the Atkins court needed to evaluate whether the actions of
the two parties in the case were true to church doctrines and
practices.6  These questions clearly delved into issues of church
doctrine, 69 and thus were ecclesiastical matters inappropriate for court
interpretation. 7' By contrast, as Justice Hudson noted in her dissent,
the issue in Harris was whether the defendants improperly used and
disposed of church funds.7 A strong argument exists that such an
inquiry does not touch on "ecclesiastical matters" and can, in fact, be
decided using "neutral principles of law." One might even argue this
is the exact inquiry that the Atkins court acknowledged to be within
the proper jurisdiction of civil courts. Indeed, the Atkins majority
specifically held that "[w]here civil, contract or property rights are
involved, the courts will inquire as to whether the church tribunal
acted within the scope of its authority and observed its own organic
forms and rules. 72
As noted earlier, the Atkins court concluded that the plaintiffs
could have pleaded (and presented evidence) in a way that would
have enabled the court to rule on the matter.73 Specifically, the court
held that the validity of any action taken by an official church body
can be contested "by showing that such action was not taken in a
meeting duly called and conducted according to the procedures of the
68. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing the questions given to
the jury at the trial court level).
69. There are some scholars who go so far as to suggest that it is possible and
desirable for a court to rule on matters that require interpretation of church bylaws and
written doctrine. One such scholar compares an inquiry of this kind to court consideration
of patent litigation. See Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution
of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1412-13 (1981). Most judges are not
scientific experts, yet our judicial system gives them the power to read and interpret
guidelines of patent law and to interpret the basic meaning of scientific discoveries that are
the subject of patent law. Why, then, can we not entrust the judiciary to perform this same
type of analysis with respect to religious doctrine and bylaws? If a judge has the
intelligence to interpret scientific language, why can he not apply "neutral principles of
law" to interpret the language of church agreements, bylaws, and other church
documents? This paper will not go so far as to advocate the adoption of the viewpoint
discussed therein.
70. See Atkins, 284 N.C. at 321, 200 S.E.2d at 651.
71. Harris v. Matthews, 361 N.C. 265, 280, 643 S.E.2d 566, 575 (2007) (Hudson, J.,
dissenting).
72. Atkins, 284 N.C. at 320, 200 S.E.2d at 651. See also discussion of Jones
accompanying supra notes 40-43, noting that it was appropriate for the Court to examine
the church's constitution in the Book of Church Order to determine property ownership.
The same methods might be useful to examine church financial procedures.
73. Id.; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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church, themselves properly adopted and then in effect."74
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the court also held that the plaintiffs
neither alleged nor presented evidence to show that the officially
established procedures of the church council were not followed
properly, and held that the court could not rule on the fairness of the
procedures themselves without overstepping the line created by the
"neutral principles" doctrine.75 As such, the court could, and would,
have ruled on an issue that required it to rely on and interpret the
meaning of church bylaws, had such an action provided a useful tool
for settling the controversy, effectively settling a dispute between
internal church factions. In Harris, however, the court acknowledged
no manner by which the plaintiffs could seek relief outside of the
church council.76
The plaintiffs in Harris alleged three specific causes of action-
"that defendant converted church funds, breached a fiduciary duty
owed to the church and its members, and engaged in a civil
conspiracy to convert money and assets of the church" 77 -all of which
the majority held to be outside the realm of church issues able to be
decided under "neutral principles of law."7" In doing so, the majority
took the position that "[d]etermining whether actions, including
expenditures, by a church's pastor, secretary, and chairman of the
Board of Trustees ... [are] proper requires an examination of the
church's view of the role of the pastor, staff, and church leaders, their
authority and compensation, and church management."79 However,
the majority failed to articulate any reasoning behind this
presumption. It seems counterintuitive that a court may use "neutral
principles of law" to determine the composition of a congregation,8 °
74. Atkins, 284 N.C. at 320, 200 S.E.2d at 651.
75. Id. at 321, 200 S.E.2d at 651.
76. See Harris, 361 N.C. at 272, 643 S.E.2d at 571.
77. Id. at 283, 643 S.E.2d at 577 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 273, 643 S.E.2d at 571.
79. Id.
Because a church's religious doctrine and practice affect its understanding of each
of these concepts, seeking a court's review of the matters presented here is no
different than asking a court to determine whether a particular church's grounds
for membership are spiritually or doctrinally correct or whether a church's
charitable pursuits accord with the congregation's beliefs. None of these issues
can be addressed using neutral principles of law.
Id.
80. The Supreme Court of the United States sanctioned this action by the Georgia
courts in the Jones case. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606-07 (1979).
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or that a church meeting was "conducted according to the [official]
procedures of the church[,]"' but not to determine whether a pastor
expended church funds according to official procedures of the church.
The actions asserted by the Harris plaintiffs could be adequately
settled using "neutral principles of law." If a civil court has
jurisdiction to determine whether a meeting was "conducted
according to the procedures of the church,"'82 and further, that such
procedures were "properly adopted and then in effect, ' 83 then it
should follow that such a court must also be within its jurisdiction to
review church bylaws to determine whether certain expenditures
were properly sanctioned.' Otherwise, holding that an issue as
simple as the one in Harris touches too closely on "ecclesiastical
matters" is essentially the equivalent of holding that church
constituents with legal rights to the property and funds of the church
are afforded no protections by the government.
Significantly, other jurisdictions have taken a much less stringent
stance on what constitutes "ecclesiastical matters," rendering the
Harris decision a national outlier in addition to a departure from past
state standards. The idea that a civil court can and should adjudicate
matters that involve secular disputes within religious organizations is
not a new one among the states. Indeed, many other jurisdictions
have a strong history of deciding these types of issues. For example,
the Supreme Court of Alabama in Murphy v. Green85 heard and
decided a case that turned on the question of whether a former pastor
and other church officials had converted church funds to support an
outside organization.86 The Alabama court ruled that, although the
issues in the case may have arisen due to spiritual differences, the
issue to be resolved was an inherently civil dispute involving issues of
property ownership and trusteeship.87 Applying Presbyterian, the
court held that, "[b]ecause the resolution of these issues requires a
court merely to review church records and incorporation documents,
without delving into spiritual matters, there is no constitutional bar to
81. The Supreme Court of North Carolina acknowledged this issue to be a correct
consideration for civil courts in Atkins. Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 320, 200 S.E.2d
641, 651 (1973).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Harris, 361 N.C. at 283, 643 S.E.2d at 577 (Hudson, J., dissenting).
85. 794 So.2d 325 (Ala. 2000).
86. Id. at 329.
87. Id. at 330.
[Vol. 861756
2008] ECCLESIASTICAL IMMUNITY 1757
a court's hearing this case."'  The Harris court could have come to
the same resolution.
Another Alabama case, Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v.
Nixon,89 took an even stronger stand on this issue. The Supreme
Court of Alabama in that case ruled that the trial court erred in
dismissing a case brought by former members of a church alleging
wrongful expulsion from the congregation for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.9" Again applying Presbyterian, the court ruled that
"there are civil, as opposed to ecclesiastical, rights which have
cognizance in the courts. A determination of whether the
fundamentals of due process have been observed can be made in the
judicial arena."91
Additionally, courts in other states have frequently interpreted
Presbyterian to mean that it is within the jurisdiction of a civil court to
rule on whether a pastor was terminated by and with the proper
church authority. 2 Such cases turn on an analysis of church bylaws
and other written documents and, as such, are analogous to certain
inquiries which are proper for courts to make in matters of church
property disputes. For example, in the Illinois case Ervin v. Lilydale
Progressive Missionary Baptist Church,93 an action was brought by a
pastor who was removed from his position by a vote of the church
board.94 The pastor alleged that the church bylaws specified that a
pastor could only be removed upon a vote of the entire
88. Id.
89. 340 So.2d 746 (Ala. 1976); see also In re Galilee Baptist Church, 186 So.2d 102,
106-07 (Ala. 1966) (holding that it was proper for a court to rule on the procedures
followed at a church congregational meeting). The Galilee court held that adequate notice
must be given to all members when a congregational meeting involving business
transactions takes place. Id. at 105-07. A court may also rule on whether the meeting was
conducted in an orderly manner, and whether the expulsion of a member is valid based on
church rules and regulations. Id.
90. Nixon, 340 So.2d at 747-48.
91. Id. at 748. Likewise, in a case very similar to Harris, the Tenth Court of Appeals
of Texas, Waco, upheld a verdict against a former pastor and his wife for fraud,
constructive fraud, and conversion-claims very similar to those pled in Harris. See
Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783,790 (Tex. App. 1997).
92. See generally Vincent v. Raglin, 318 N.W.2d 629, 634 (Mich. App. 1981)
(remanding the case to the trial court to determine whether a pastor was properly
terminated); Tibbs v. Kendrick, 637 N.E.2d 397, 402 (Ohio App. 1994) (holding that, in a
congregational church, "a civil court retains jurisdiction to determine whether the decision
concerning 'who shall preach from the pulpit' was made by the proper church authority");
Williams v. Wilson, 563 S.E.2d 320, 323 (S.C. 2002) (holding that the trustees in this case
had no authority to dismiss the pastor because such an act was the exclusive prerogative of
the church membership).
93. 813 N.E.2d 1073 (Il1. App. 2004).
94. Id. at 1074.
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congregation-an act that did not occur in his case-and brought suit
to enforce adherence to those bylaws.95 The trial court ruled that the
decision of the church board members was an ecclesiastical one, and
thus was outside the jurisdiction of the court.96 However, the
Supreme Court of Illinois overruled the lower court and held that the
church board did not have the proper authority to remove the pastor
without the vote of the congregation.97 The Supreme Court of Illinois
recognized that it was proper for a civil court to interpret church
bylaws when settling a dispute. An inquiry into similar church
documents in Harris would have allowed the court to reach a decision
settling the property dispute. Specifically, the Harris court could have
examined the bylaws to the church's corporate structure or other
instructive documents to determine the financial structure of the
church organization. Such an inquiry could have shed light on the
appropriate use of church funds, allowing the court to make a ruling
on whether they were inappropriately used by the defendants.
The history in both North Carolina and other states indicates
that congregations, religious organizations, and church members turn
to civil courts for resolution of many issues, particularly those in
which they feel they have been wronged and have no other avenue by
which to pursue relief. Commentator Ira Ellman stated,
It would be simple indeed to deal with all of these conflicts with
a policy of noninvolvement .... But courts serve neither the
church nor its members by placing their affairs in a special law-
free zone. Law-free is also lawless, and the consequence is that
neither the faithful, nor the church or those with which it deals,
can rely on the other parties playing by the rules, for there are
then no enforceable rules .... The solution most of the time is
to honor internal church agreements just as a court would
honor the internal agreements of a secular organization.98
As this Recent Development has argued, the practical effect of
the Supreme Court of North Carolina's recent holding in Harris is to
deny religious organizations these civil protections. The allegations in
the Harris case-specifically the property conversion claims-are
very similar to the allegations presented by and against religious
organizations in other states, and can be decided based on "neutral
principles of law." By refusing to hear the Harris case due to First
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1077-78.
98. Ellman, supra note 69, at 1444.
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Amendment concerns, the North Carolina court has misconstrued the
breadth of protection afforded to religious bodies. As courts in other
states have recognized, a court is not ruling on "ecclesiastical affairs"
when it merely interprets church bylaws or examines church financial
records." An inquiry of that kind would have resolved the dispute in
Harris.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina's refusal to hear the
Harris case signals a sad future for religious bodies hoping to settle
civil disputes in a court of law in the state of North Carolina. To deny
that a civil court is justified in interpreting church bylaws and other
written governance documents effectively prevents any church-
related claim from reaching the trial stage, effectually granting total
civil immunity to all church officials when any religious entanglement
question surfaces."° While a clear argument against such a policy
points to instances of abuse of power from officials within the
organization, perhaps a more nuanced argument against such a policy
is that it robs both members and organizations of their due process
rights. As one scholar has articulated, "the [price] of immunity ... is
denying church members ordinarily available remedies, solely on the
account of the religious nature of the organization in which the
corporation, contract, or trust dispute arose." 10'
Moreover, many church congregations, including ones ultimately
governed by hierarchical organizations, have chosen a primarily
democratic structure by which to conduct their insular activities."°2 In
such situations, denying religious organizations their day in civil court
seems even more outrageous as it withholds democratic protections
from bodies that have voluntarily chosen a democratic structure.
Indeed:
99. See, e.g., Abysinnia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So.2d 746, 748 (Ala.
1976).
100. See generally Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise
Doctrine, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925, 952 (2000) ("[T]he time has come to abandon the
religious exemption doctrine and construct a more plausible and defensible doctrine that
takes account of the regrettably diminished place of religion in contemporary society.").
101. Ellman, supra note 69, at 1383. Ellman also notes that the goal of "avoidance of
judicial involvement in church disputes... is not achieved by deference to the hierarchy."
Id. at 1411. Further, he points out that "[d]eference is also intervention, since it asserts the
authority of the state into an internal church dispute in support of one faction," the church
hierarchy. Id. Finally, Ellman notes that the mere fact that a court "avoid[s] hearing the
parties' evidence ... hardly means that there is no intrusion" by the court into church
affairs. Id.
102. For the proposition that Baptist churches are governed by a majority vote of their
congregations, see Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 312, 200 S.E.2d 641, 645-46 (1973);
Reid v. Johnston, 241 N.C. 201, 212, 85 S.E.2d 114, 123 (1954); Dix v. Pruitt, 194 N.C. 64,
69, 138 S.E. 412, 415 (1927).
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[A] court should not impose a hierarchy on members who have
chosen a democratic structure. If the Constitution bars the
government, through its courts, from imposing a democratic
polity upon a church that prefers an absolute hierarchy, then
surely it also bars the courts from imposing an absolute
hierarchy upon a church that has chosen to give its ruling
authorities more limited power. °3
Critics would argue that the application of "neutral principles of
law" to interpret any church document, secular in nature or
otherwise, verges on ruling on ecclesiastical matters. A concern of
this nature is not completely without merit-the line between
ecclesiastical and lay matters is admittedly a fine one. An argument
that any interpretation of church documents assumes a greater
understanding of the wider doctrine of the church may be legitimate
in a great number of cases. However, an absolute, preemptive ban on
adjudication of these matters is extreme, to say the least. The
argument that it is desirable to afford religious organizations the
rights and benefits of average citizens and organization is "too
obvious to require extended discussion; after all, we normally do
enforce private contractual arrangements, and the belief that such
enforcement is appropriate and necessary is rather basic to common
law jurisprudence."'I
The Supreme Court of the United States, in writing its
Presbyterian decision, did not intend to preclude all matters
connected to a religious organization from receiving the protections
afforded by state and federal law. Neither did the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in Atkins v. Walker intend to deprive religious
institutions the protections of state government regulation of their
secular interests. However, the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
decision in Harris v. Matthews marked a departure from both
Presbyterian and Atkins and effectively took away the protections
contemplated both by its own precedent and the Supreme Court of
the United States. It is understandable that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina acted with caution in its holding, as the protections
afforded to religious bodies by the First Amendment are strong and
should not be taken lightly. Nevertheless, it was simply not necessary
to strip religious organizations of their rights to have civil matters
determined and resolved by a court of law in order to protect their
First Amendment rights. The court's decision in Harris places
103. Ellman, supra note 69, at 1404.
104. Id. at 1402.
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religious organizations in North Carolina in a precarious position. In
the future, such organizations may find themselves without weapons
to combat internal injustice other than the potentially biased ones
afforded by their organizations.
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